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DRAWING (GAD)FLIES: THOUGHTS ON THE USES (OR
USELESSNESS) OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Sherman J. Clark*
In this essay, I argue that law schools should continue to encourage and
support wide-ranging legal scholarship, even if much of it does not seem to be
of immediate use to the legal profession. I do not emphasize the relatively
obvious point that scholarship is a process through which we study the law so
that we can ultimately make useful contributions. Here, rather, I make two
more-subtle points. First, legal academics ought to question the priorities of
the legal profession, rather than merely take those priorities as given. We
ought to serve as Socratic gadflies—challenging rather than merely mirroring
regnant assumptions about what ought to matter in and to the law. Second, the
freedom to serve this role is a large part of what attracts people capable of
doing so to academic life. If we were to insist that legal scholars think about
only those things that already matter to the legal profession, we would not
attract the people we most need—people willing and able to help us rethink
our assumptions about what ought to matter.

I. QUESTIONING THE PRIORITIES OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
A. Welcoming Scrutiny
The apparent uselessness of much legal scholarship is a recurring
theme in the legal profession. The persistence of this critique is well
illustrated by D.C. Circuit Judge Harry Edwards, who followed up his
notorious 1992 Michigan Law Review article with a recent piece in the
Virginia Law Review making essentially the same point—that legal
scholarship is too far removed from, and thus of little use to, the bench
and the bar.1 This debate has been rekindled in the academy by Jeffrey
Harrison and Amy Mashburn, who have argued that citation rates
overstate the influence of scholarship and have suggested that we
increase “the accountability of legal scholars and the utility of what they

* Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
1.
Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Harry T. Edwards, Another Look at Professor Rodell’s
Goodbye to Law Reviews, 100 VA. L. REV. 1483 (2014).
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produce.”2
As with the broader pressures law schools are facing, we should
embrace and learn from this scrutiny. What follows, therefore, is not a
defense of the status quo. It is clear, for example, that citation-counting
is a poor way to measure the value of scholarship, that much scholarship
is driven by career advancement rather than authentic inquiry, and that
much research is of little utility. We should welcome efforts to help us
focus our work. Moreover, responding thoughtfully to questions about
our research can help us be more thoughtful about the appropriate role of
legal education as a whole. In that spirit, this essay aims to highlight
three related ideas about the uses (or uselessness) of legal scholarship.
First, at least some legal scholarship should question, rather than
accept as given, the current aims and priorities of the legal profession
and policy-makers. We should be willing to rethink, rather than merely
reflect, current ideas about what matters—about what is or is not truly
useful. Our aim is and should be, at least in part, to turn the attention of
lawyers, judges and policymakers towards aspects and implications of
the law that they do not yet see as important. Thus, some of our work
will, by definition, initially strike the legal profession as useless—at
least if we are doing our job. In this way the disjunction between legal
scholarship and the profession is a blessing as well a curse. Second,
lawyers who have the capacity to do this sort of thinking choose
academic careers largely so that they can exercise that capacity. Support
for a certain amount of wide-ranging scholarship thus attracts and helps
retain scholars who can challenge and rethink assumptions of the
profession about how the law works and what ought or ought not matter.
Third, legal academics with this ability and inclination can—if they are
also good and dedicated teachers—help students develop useful and
practical versions of that same capacity.
B. Megalegoria
Legal academics serve the profession best and most fully when we
do not simply help lawyers and judges do what they already think
matters, but rather when we question what they are doing and encourage
them to rethink what ought to matter.
“Megalegoria” is the term used by Xenophon to describe the way

2. Jeffrey L. Harrison and Amy R. Mashburn, Citations, Justifications, and the Trouble State of
Legal Scholarship: An Empirical Study, (University of Florida Levin College of Law Research
Paper No. 15-2, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2569499.
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Socrates spoke to the Athenian jurors at his trial.3 It means, literally,
“big-talking,” and carries connotations of arrogance, self-importance,
and overstepping one’s appropriate role. Similar charges are frequently
leveled at legal academics, and with much more justification. We are not
Socrates. It is good, if discomforting, to be reminded of that fact
regularly by the profession we serve and by the students we teach. There
is, however, a sense in which we can and should emulate Socrates. He
was dedicated to the service of his city—first on the battlefield and later
by doing the more dangerous work of persistently questioning that city.
He questioned not only his city’s practices but also its aims and
priorities. As a self-styled gadfly, he served his city not by thinking and
talking about what the citizens already valued, but rather, by challenging
their ideas about what they should value. At least some law professors
should do the same, and we should be grateful if the consequence of
doing so is merely that we are sometimes seen as out of touch or
annoying.
In this light, there is a sense in which critics of legal academia may
actually overstate the value of much legal scholarship. They seem to
assume that, if legal research is actually read and put to work by the
profession, it is therefore of at least some value. But, that is not
necessarily the case. Being useful to people’s work is not, for that
reason, worthwhile unless the work is itself worthwhile. To the extent
that we are merely Lilliputian law professors helping people argue about
which end of the egg to break—however instrumental we might be to
that end—we are not doing anything of actual worth. Scholarship that
takes as given the current aims and priorities of lawyers, judges, and
policymakers is not doing any of them the service they need and
deserve. And this means that if we are doing our job we will do some
work that lawyers, judges, and policymakers do not yet think
worthwhile. Rather than being defensive, we should focus on better
explaining why our ideas are important.
Lawyers engaged in particular work for particular clients or
constituents are not often in a good position to step back from that work
and ask how the law fits together more broadly. Less often are they in a
position to question whether and how the enterprise as a whole is serving
the community. But as legal academics we are in such a position. We
serve the profession and the community best and most fully when we
reflect upon, rather than merely reflect, accepted ideas about what is or
is not useful. And providing that service requires several things: first,

3.
XENOPHON, XENOPHON’S APOLOGY OF SOCRATES (David Konstan, ed. , Bryn Mawr
Commentaries, Inc. 1987).
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that we have in the law schools authentic, creative scholars who are
capable of seeing familiar things in new ways; and second, that we
support and encourage students to do so as well.
II. ATTRACTING NEW PROFESSORS WHO HAVE THE NECESSARY SKILLS
A. Drawing (Gad)flies
Lawyers who are not only willing but also truly able to rethink and
challenge the aims and priorities of the profession in the way the
profession needs and deserves are hard to find—such lawyers have many
career options other than teaching law.
At his trial, Socrates said that if the Athenians were to kill him, they
would not easily find his like again;4 many of the jurors, no doubt, hoped
he was right. But the serious point behind Socrates’s remark was that it
is not easy to find and retain gadflies who are both capable of rethinking
accepted priorities and willing to spend their lives doing so. And the
situation faced by law schools in hiring teachers is in some ways more
difficult still. Our first and essential mission is to help prepare young
lawyers for the practice of law, so our gadflies must be also and above
all good teachers.
It is clear, however, that the brightest and most creative young
lawyers are not always or necessarily the best teachers. That is why the
capacity to rethink the basic aims and assumptions of the law is only one
of many things we look for in teachers. It is why we employ a range of
teachers who bring to bear a range of capacities, knowledge, and
experiences. The particular talent I emphasize here is just one of many
things we need on law faculties. And of the potential academics who
have this particular capacity, fewer still also have the other traits
necessary for an excellent law teacher—a thorough knowledge of their
subject, an understanding of and appreciation for the work our students
will do, strong communication skills, work ethic, and the like.
As much as we like to joke about how “those who can’t do, teach,”
the fact is that people with these capacities have many options. And
many of these options are more lucrative and/or offer an opportunity to
make a more direct and immediate impact on the community. We need
at least some of them to come into teaching. And what brings them into
teaching is in large part the opportunity to work on the things they

4.
PLATO’S APOLOGY OF SOCRATES: A COMMENTARY 93 (Paul Allen Miller & Charles
Platter, eds., University of Oklahoma Press 2010).
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believe truly matter. If they wanted to think and write about only those
things that a client or constituency already values, and only in ways that
client or constituency would immediately embrace, they would go to
work in private practice or government and do so.
Obviously, not any effort to encourage more useful or focused legal
scholarship would immediately drive these teachers away; but some
measures eventually might. For example, Harrison and Mashburn
suggest that teaching loads be conditioned on a process of advanced
submission and approval of specific research projects based on their
perceived usefulness.5 Set aside for the moment whether such a policy
would be a good idea for any particular law faculty as currently
constituted. A law school adopting such a policy would find it difficult
to hire and retain the brightest and most creative young academics.
B. Corrupting the Youth
The capacity to think critically and originally about the law is also
essential to authentic, Socratic teaching. If it lives up to its ideals,
Socratic teaching can help future lawyers develop practical versions of
that same capacity.
At least some law schools believe that this sort of teacher—who
values the job because it supports not-yet-valued research—should still
form an important subset of our faculties. I should emphasize the terms
some and subset. Not every law school will want to attract or retain this
sort of law teacher. And no law school should want all of its classes
taught by such teachers. Different schools have different views about
who should be teaching law, and thus will have varying perspectives
about the importance of attracting and retaining the sort of potential
Socratic gadflies I have described here. And our views on who should
be teaching law will in turn hinge on our views about the appropriate
aims of legal education more broadly.
Thus, the question of whether and how to support scholarship forces
us to think also about how and what we hope to teach. What knowledge,
skills, and capacities do we most want our students to develop? The first
and most obvious answer, of course, is that our students need to learn the
law—doctrine, procedure, and the like. Teaching the substance of the
law is our essential mission, and nothing I say here is meant to suggest
otherwise.
But, of course, our aim is not merely to teach legal doctrine and

5. Harrison & Mashburn, supra note 2, at 61–62.
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procedure. Along with the substance of the law in any particular class,
we hope to help our students develop capacities that will serve them
throughout their careers. Some of those are relatively narrow
professional skills, but others are broader and deeper—intellectual
capacities and habits of mind that will transcend any given subject
matter. One such capacity is a variation of the one I have described
above—the ability to see familiar issues in a new light or from a new
perspective. We hope that our students will learn to think carefully but
creatively about legal issues—to reexamine, rather than merely track,
how those issues have previously been framed. We hope they will learn
to see new aspects of, or relationships between, issues.
This may seem far removed from the practical work of the law. It
may thus be suggested that most law students just need to learn the law
as it is, and we are wasting their time encouraging them to think
creatively about the law and its aims. That view would be short-sighted
and would sell our students short. While the ability to see familiar issues
in new ways is just one of many capacities a lawyer needs, it is a
valuable and practical capacity indeed. Although practicing lawyers may
not have motive or opportunity to rethink the basic aims and
assumptions of the law, we should treat and teach each student as if he
or she is capable of doing so. More to the present point, all of our
students will benefit from nurturing this capacity in ways that will serve
them in the work they do. Every day, lawyers solve problems, serve their
clients, and benefit society by seeing familiar issues in new and helpful
ways—if, that is, they have acquired the capacity to do so.
Thus, a teacher need not only have and be willing to pursue fresh
insights, but must also see and nurture such insights in students. Even
the brightest students will have just seeds of ideas—not fully developed
theories, but rather tentative, fresh perspectives. We fail our students
badly when we miss or dismiss a potential insight because it is not
framed in the way we have come to expect. We should recognize a
nascent insight, even if it is coming from a very different perspective—
especially if it is coming from a very different perspective. That is a
precious moment in the intellectual life of a young lawyer. We should
seize it. We should be able to grasp the heart of what the student is
trying to get at, and then press the student to clarify it, explain it, and
explore it. This is what nurtures the capacity for creative and critical
thinking—that is also clear and careful. And, crucially, we must do this
in ways that further and enhance, rather than compromise or distract
from, the core mission of teaching the doctrine and skills everyone in the
class needs. I explore this vision of teaching in a companion Caveat
essay—The Seventh Letter and the Socratic Method, 49 U. MICH. J.L.
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REFORM CAVEAT 52; so suffice it to say here that it is this sort of
teaching that merits being called Socratic, and which makes a legal
academic useful not just as a gadfly to the profession but also as a
teacher to future professionals.
C. Know Thyself
Our obligation is to do for the profession what it needs rather than
what it wants. But, we can learn a great deal from listening carefully to
questions and criticisms about the value of our work because that forces
us to think more deeply about what we do.
In evaluating the considerations that I have highlighted here, it
should be acknowledged that different law schools may have different
aims. Those of us who teach law and participate in law school
governance should ask ourselves what our aims are. What is our vision
of legal education? How do we conceive of our roles as scholars and
teachers? What aspirations do we hold for our students? How much do
we value, if at all, the capacity for insightful, authentic thinking about
both the operation and aims of the law? More broadly, along with
doctrinal knowledge and professional skills narrowly defined, what
deeper traits and capacities do we believe our students should strive to
develop? These questions, of course, are relevant not just to our
thinking about whether and how to encourage legal scholarship, but also
to a range of questions about legal education. This is why thinking about
this particular issue can help us conceive of legal education more
broadly. This is why we should welcome, rather than respond
defensively to, the hard questions from the profession.

